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Competitiveness in India and China: The FDI Puzzle
(Forthcoming, Asia Pacific Business Review)

Penelope B. Prime, Ph.D., Mercer University
Vijaya Subrahmanyam, Ph.D, Mercer University
Chen Miao Lin, Ph.D., Clayton State University

Abstract: Given their growth records, large markets, and reformed economic systems,
both China and India appear to be equally likely candidates for foreign direct investment
(FDI). Yet, China has received substantially more FDI. The literature comparing FDI in
these two countries is small, and does not provide conclusive evidence to explain this
puzzle. Applying the Porterian framework of the competitiveness of nations to compare
China and India, we garner evidence that differences in demand, factor conditions and
firm strategy, structure and rivalry are not sufficient to explain the differential in the two
countries’ FDI flows. Differences in related and supporting industries, as well as Porter’s
other two factors—government and chance factors—are more compelling. We identify
China’s early entry into East Asian production networks in the 1980s as a key factor
pushing China ahead of India in terms of FDI. We argue that this coincidental mix of
timing and geography (Porter’s ‘chance’ factor), pushed forward in China by establishing
special economic zones, gave China a sustainable competitive advantage for the
following two decades. What is implied from these findings is that China’s FDI sources
have been much larger and heavily slanted towards East Asia and manufacturing, while
India, having missed this particular historical phase, needed to find an alternate route to
development and global competitiveness.
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Competitiveness in India and China: The FDI puzzle

Introduction
Impressive projections of growth in India and China are increasingly optimistic
and have caught the attention of analysts and policy makers around the world. By
purchasing power measures, in 2010 India was ranked as the fourth largest economy in
the world in terms of the value of goods and services produced annually, and China was
second. In the five years from 2005 to 2009, India’s average GDP growth rate has been
8.5 percent and China’s has been 11.4 percent (World Databank). The importance of
trade and foreign investment in China has grown substantially, which has been a hallmark
of the success of China’s opening policies that began almost three decades ago. India
began to encourage trade and foreign investment a decade later than China, but has also
successfully changed India’s trade dynamics with the global economy. Based on the
World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Index for 2010-11, China ranked 27th
and India was 51st. In the 2001-02 report, China was 39th and India was 57th , showing
that competitiveness has improved substantially in both countries relative to many others
(World Economic Forum, 2009).
In contrast, in decades past both India and China pursued import substitution
industrialization policies aimed at isolation from the global economy. Both countries
combined restrictive trade policies with various degrees of economic planning and
regulation, all of which focused on building productive capacity at the expense of
consumer preferences. Imports and production of non-essential consumer goods were
highly restricted. The fact that these economies have rejoined the market-oriented,
international system represents revolutionary shifts in policy, and consumers have been
one of the major beneficiaries.
Given the growth paths and the size of these two economies, both countries would
seem to be magnets for multinational corporations. However, China’s foreign
investment, and especially foreign direct investment (FDI), has been multiple times more
than India's. Between 1995 and 2009, China received approximately $730 billion more
than India. There has been much debate about the measures used to assess the FDI
potential of the two countries, but even when adjustments are made for differences in
2

data categories, China’s FDI is surprisingly higher than India’s (Khanna 2007, pp.157-58;
Swamy 2006). In this paper we focus on what factors or strategies caused China to
attract more FDI as compared to India. Using Porter’s framework, we explore each
country’s circumstances that support or impede the pursuit of strategic competitiveness
(Porter, 1998a). We argue that Porter’s factors of “chance” and “government” played
crucial roles in attracting a higher level of FDI to China and also defined the type of FDI
in one nation versus the other. We believe that the story of China’s substantial lead in
FDI lies in its fortuitous location intertwined with the timing of its reforms that resulted
in its increasingly central role in the East Asian region.

China-India FDI Literature
The substantial difference in the level of FDI receipts in these two nations is a
puzzle. There are numerous publications comparing economic growth and transition in
China and India on various dimensions, but there are very few studies that focus on FDI
per se.1 Most studies focus on explanations for differences in growth and other
performance variables, with FDI sometimes included as one factor.
One exception is a paper by Wei (2005) that tries to explain the FDI differential
directly. Using OECD data across countries and over time on home country outward
investment to China and India, Wei tested for possible factors that are significant in
explaining FDI flows. Based on 1987 to 2000 FDI flows for 15 countries, Wei found that
both countries benefit from their large domestic markets (measured as the ratio of real
home country GDP to real host country’s GDP), but that China’s relatively larger market
overwhelms some of India’s other advantages. Interestingly, India benefits from
relatively lower labor costs, as well as lower country risk, while China benefits from
more advanced trade ties with the OECD countries.

This approach of using outward

FDI data from OECD provides adequate data for statistical analysis and also minimizes
data discrepancy issues since the FDI definitions are the same and are reported by the
home countries. However, as Wei’s study only covers OECD countries, which do not
make up the majority of FDI inflow to either India or China, the author acknowledges
that the results are only a part of the story.
A second paper by Sinha, Kent and Shomali (2007) used data from three subregions in China for 1978-2005, and separately from six states in India for 1992-2005, to
estimate in each case how the business climates affected FDI inflows. In the case of
3

India, their model suggests a positive correlation between FDI inflow and human capital,
market size and rate of growth. In their China estimates, structural changes, strategic
infrastructure and strategic policy are positively correlated with FDI inflows, along with
market size and rate of growth. As these data, variables and results are described only
briefly in the paper, it is difficult to compare this work with Wei’s study or to provide
more details. Not surprisingly, the authors conclude that India needs structural change,
better infrastructure and more enlightened policy to attract more FDI.
Using an alternative approach, Henley (2004) focuses on political differences.
Henley argues that some interest groups within India have impeded liberalization.
Specifically he suggests that they pressure various levels of government for spending
resulting in public deficits that prevent government funding for infrastructure and other
pro-development projects, thus discouraging FDI.

In contrast, local governments in

China responded to incentives to promote FDI, including direct mandates to show that
they had attracted FDI, as well as opportunities to reap the tax revenues that would be
generated by these companies. Henley argues that local governments in India have much
less motivation to want FDI in their jurisdictions. While political differences no doubt
matter in some aspects—especially the slowness of opening the economy to global
business in the 1980s—this explanation seems inadequate to us. There are certainly
states in India that have attracted FDI, just as in China certain provinces and cities have
benefitted relatively more from foreign investment. In addition, some analysts argue that
India’s democracy is a distinct political advantage over China’s one-party system, which
would make politics a relative strength for India. Fan and Li (2009) note that while the
Indian growth process is chaotic, India’s soft infrastructure, which includes a independent
press, an independent judicial system and educational system, is robust putting India at an
advantage. Particular credit is given to the banking infrastructure that was not deeply
affected by the recent financial meltdown of the developed nations.
Kumar and Worm’s (2004) study provides a detailed examination of the various
aspects of institutional environments in India and China in order to compare business
negotiation processes. They note that while the regulatory environment can be a hurdle
for investors in both nations, these barriers are more easily navigated in China than in
India given the incentives for bureaucrats to promote economic growth in their regions.
This has been substantiated by Sebastian, Parameswaran and Yahya (2006) in their
examination of the Indian business environment via a survey of business managers.
4

Their results showed that Indian bureaucracy is viewed by a number of sources as
tedious, vague and tiring.2
In a more comprehensive comparison of economic development in the two
countries, Guruswamy and Singh (2010) focus on key differences in policies and
performance. As part of their analysis, the authors discuss China’s integration with Asia
more generally as one distinct difference from India. In this paper we argue that China’s
timing and geographical relationship with Asia is the key factor for understanding the
differential flows of FDI. China’s post-Mao reforms began in the late 1970s, opening
southern China to foreign investment and trade in the early 1980s at a historical moment
when companies from Japan, South Korea, Hong Kong and Taiwan were looking for low
cost manufacturing locations beyond their own borders. Complementary to this was also
the fact that the China option was geographically convenient, and was helped by similar
cultural affinities, which led to the development of a manufacturing base that then built
economies of scale and agglomeration. This process led to infrastructure improvements,
increased trade, technology spillovers and eventually spread effects to other parts of
China. Since India’s opening to foreign investment and trade was a decade, India was
not an option for this particular wave of cost-seeking capital flows.
Our analysis fills an important gap in this literature. There are very few studies
that address the reasons for the large FDI differential between India and China, although
this fact is well known. Partly due to macro data compatibility and availability issues,
econometric analysis of this question is problematic and when done, is not very
informative. Using a different approach, this paper carefully incorporates a series of
country-level factors that have been identified in the literature as key to attracting FDI to
provide a thorough analysis of the comparative competitiveness of China and India.

FDI Location Literature: increasing importance of spatial concentration and
alliances
FDI location has been studied in the literature with a focus on factors that push or
pull companies to invest abroad (Krugman 1991, Porter 1994, Chen and Chen 1998,
Majocchi and Strange 2007). An early FDI framework was provided by Dunning (1977,
1980)—the so-called eclectic approach to understanding the location decisions of foreign
companies. In addition, other studies such as Rugman and Verbeke (2001) and
Andresson et al. (2002) show that international strategies are formulated to tap local
5

know-how and resources to increase competitiveness. In more recent work Dunning
(2008) refined his ideas given the entrance of new participants such as China and India as
viable investment locations as well as sources of outward investment. He also expands
on changes in the spatial dimension of FDI location, observing a paradox: although more
nations have become welcoming to investment, concentration of production in certain
locations has been more the norm, at least in certain sectors such as manufacturing.
Clustering, then, encourages cooperative ventures and may help firms learn. He discusses
the ‘contemporary network MNE’ in this context as a coordinator of a global system of
value added activities referencing emerging economies of Asia as a testing ground for the
interplay between institutional change at the macro level and organizational
transformation at the micro level.
Michael Porter’s work has also defined the development of this literature. Porter
(1998a) asked whether there are specific characteristics in a nation that result in firms that
create and sustain competitive advantage in certain industries. Porter argues that in this
new age, when firms in different nations form alliances, those firms based in nations
which support true competitive advantage eventually emerge as international leaders. To
succeed, competitive advantage can be created in two distinct ways—configuration and
coordination. Configuration is where a global firm spreads activities among nations to
serve the world market; coordination is the ability of a global firm to manage
productively the dispersed activities from manufacturing to distribution to marketing.
Porter’s work on clusters recognized that while location remains fundamental to
competition, its role has changed in terms of how companies should be configured, how
institutions and ancillary industries can contribute to its continued success, and how
governments can support economic development and prosperity.
Along these lines, Contractor (2009) noted that cooperation among firms is an
integral part of the new model for business in a globalized world and has made some
sweeping changes in the global environment from liberalization of FDI rules, changing
intellectual property rights, harmonization of standards and outsourcing of business
functions. With this business model the largest economic grouping is no longer a MNC
but global industry networks consisting of companies that simultaneously compete and
cooperate. In line with Porter’s arguments, Contractor (2009) shows that the new
alliance network economy provides more flexibility, lowers risk for each member
company and speeds the response to changing markets more than is possible within a
6

single firm. The value chain is thus outsourced over several companies in different
nations creating a cooperative model that has become an essential theme in global
business.

Hypothesis
In this paper we apply a broad scope of factors that are included in the concept of
national competitiveness. We draw primarily on Porter, since his work emphasizes the
characteristics of nations that attract companies to invest. Drawing particularly on the
location and clustering aspects of FDI, our specific research proposition is as follows:

We hypothesize that China had a fortunate combination of geographic location
and timing that enabled firms to build alliances with other firms of multiple
nations to meet the needs of international business at that time. This happened
both earlier and more completely than in India, thus attracting more FDI that in
turn contributed to China’s increasing competitive advantage.

Specifically, the establishment of the special economic zones in southern China in
the early 1980s provided incentives, labor and infrastructure for foreign firms to
locate there for low-cost, labor-intensive manufacturing. As East Asian firms
were central to the manufacturing supply chain at this time, moving to China was
geographically and culturally convenient. Once begun, a path-dependent
virtuous cycle was set in motion that built an integrated supply-chain
manufacturing base with economies of scale and agglomeration effects
incorporating Chinese firms into this vital dynamic.

Comparing levels of FDI and FDI performance
In this section we compare data on inward FDI to India and China to establish the
differences and trends in FDI. Based on the data in table 1, India in the 1970s had a lead
in FDI compared to China. However, while India’s FDI share fluctuated in the decade of
the 1970s with a substantial rise in 1980, China was simultaneously opening to FDI and
trade, resulting in an almost steady rise in FDI both from within Asia and the rest of the
world. Twenty years later, China became the world’s strongest magnet for overseas
investment (Wei and Dutta, 2004). Post 1980 the proportion of world FDI flowing to
7

India rapidly declined and despite liberalization in 1991, FDI remained low for the next
two decades until 2006. China’s large FDI differential over India is clearly reflected in
these figures.

[Table 1 here]

To further substantiate the differential in FDI between the two nations, table 2
presents investment performance indices reported by UNCTAD. The Inward FDI
Performance Index is the ratio of a country´s share in global FDI inflows to its share in
global GDP. A value of one implies that the shares of global FDI flows and global GDP
are equal while a value higher than one implies that the nation attracts more FDI than
could be expected on the basis of its relative GDP size.
Based on the performance indices for these nations, China consistently has
attracted more FDI than would be expected based on its size. With the Asian crisis in
1997, the performance index, while still greater than one, did substantially decline. This
trend continued until the 2000s when it increased its FDI share once again only to decline
again post 2005 and go below one for the first time since 1988. India showed a wholly
different picture in terms of FDI performance. While remaining less than one throughout
the period, it showed a steady increase except for a slight decline following the Asian
crisis. In the more recent years, its FDI performance has been on the rise.
The Inward FDI Potential Index, in the second data column in table 2, captures
several factors other than market size that are expected to affect an economy’s
attractiveness to foreign investors. It is constructed as the un-weighted average of the
normalized values of several variables that correspond largely to the levels of economic
development.3 It is an average of the values of the variables, normalized to yield a score
between zero, for the lowest scoring country, to one, for the highest. This index shows
that India lagged behind China over the three decades in its score for potential FDI.
Moreover, China consistently increased in attractiveness to receive FDI over time, while
India’s score remained almost constant since 1993 even though this is after India’s
economic liberalization had begun in earnest. 4
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[Table 2 here]

Analytical Framework
We use Porter’s model, also known as the diamond framework, to explain the
differences in the FDI that China has received as compared with India. Porter’s model
includes four basic interacting elements that a nation can create resulting in advantages
that are determinants of a nation’s competitive advantage. He argues that each of these
four elements individually, and as a whole, lead to a nation’s advantage or disadvantage
in global markets.

The elements of the diamond are described as follows.

1. Demand Conditions: Higher demand in local markets leads to national advantage.
Demand may include both the quantity demanded and the sophistication of the consumers
in the home market. For example, if the market for a product and its sophistication is
largely local, then local firms devote more attention to that product than do foreign firms,
leading to competitive advantage when the local firms begin exporting the product.

2. Factor Conditions: Factors such as land, labor and capital that can be exploited by
firms in the nation are seen as beneficial in advancing competitiveness of firms. As
economies develop and compete, if they have not yet invested in such factors as
infrastructure, skilled resources and technology, then this in itself is an opportunity for
entrepreneurship and innovation. For instance, if a nation has a shortage of labor, firms
may be motivated to automate or outsource its labor-intensive tasks. Therefore, having a
good stock of endowments may be beneficial but is not sufficient to be competitive, just
as lack of endowments does not have to be a permanent constraint for any given nation,
especially because it creates opportunities for alliances among firms across nations.

3. Firm Strategy, Structure, and Rivalry: Local conditions affect firm strategy. Firm
strategy and structure help to determine in which types of industries a nation's firms will
prosper. In Porter’s model, less competition (low rivalry) makes an industry attractive
9

for entrants or incumbents. However, for an industry and a nation over the long-term,
more local rivalry is better since it puts pressure on firms to innovate and improve,
making it more likely that they will be able to successfully compete globally.

4. Related and Supporting Industries: Ancillary businesses are needed by firms for parts
of the value chain, such as suppliers and distributors who then support local industries.
These include consultancies, contractors, outsourcing firms or any support firms that help
in cost effectiveness and innovative inputs and outputs. This effect is strengthened when
the suppliers themselves are strong global competitors.
Elements of the Porter’s diamond affect one another and depend on each other.
For example, factor conditions will not lead firms to innovate unless there is sufficient
rivalry. Increased demand and consumer awareness will lead to increased local firms
entering the market, thus increasing rivalry. This increased rivalry should lead to more
innovation, which increases the need for support industries to make the value chain
stronger thus increasing growth and stimulating more demand.
In addition to the basic diamond, Porter also notes two other variables can play an
important role—government and chance. He defines the role of government as that of a
catalyst (or impediment) to encourage and support (or suppress) entrepreneurship and
policies that help move firms in a nation to higher levels of competitive performance.
Porter emphasized that government should encourage companies to raise their
performance, stimulate early demand for advanced products, focus on specialized factor
creation, stimulate local rivalry and enforce anti-trust regulations.
Porter also recognized that chance can play a role in invention, entrepreneurship
and competitive advantage. He noted that chance events are important since they often
create conditions that can shift competition in unexpected ways and alter conditions in
the diamond. While chance events can allow shifts in competitive advantage in an
industry, a nation’s attributes play an important role in how a nation exploits them to its
advantage. Porter stated in his 1998a work, “The nation that has the most favorable
‘diamond’ will be most likely to convert chance events into competitive advantage” (p.
125).
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Analysis and Discussion: Explaining the China-India FDI Differential
Using Porter’s model of a nation’s competitive advantage, we present a
comparative analysis of the two countries’ determinants in order to identify the
differentiators that may explain the large FDI flows to China as compared with India.

1. Demand conditions
Countries gain a competitive advantage and hence are more attractive when they
present an untapped market share for goods and services as well as a growing
sophisticated and healthier customer base. India and China are both attractive from this
angle with large populations defining potentially underserved markets, with substantial
increases in levels of income over time.
China’s official population was 981 million in 1980, and India’s was 687 million.
In 2008, China still surpassed India at 1.32 billion while India’s population was 1.14
billion. India is expected to surpass China in the future since India’s growth rate was
substantially higher at 1.34 percent per year compared with China’s 0.55 percent in 2008
(World Databank).
In addition to the population demographics, in the last decade both nations have
seen increases in per capita incomes creating additional capacity for consumption.
However, these trends have changed over time. In 1980 India had a higher GDP per
capita at $229 compared with China’s $186 (World Bank Databank). China had just
opened its markets in 1979. Since then, China grew very rapidly and in the last three
decades has witnessed almost a doubling of its GDP per capita, so that by 2008 China’s
GDP per capita had reached $5,083 while India’s had reached only $2,600. Since 2001,
however, India’s growth has improved to 5.6 percent per year compared with 3.2 percent
between 1980 and 2000. Still, China continued to grow quickly with GDP per capita
growing at 8.1 percent in the first two decades and 9.3 percent between 2000 and 2008.
While China is ahead of India by these measures, both countries have seen
impressive growth. In the early 1980s India was ahead, with China surpassing India’s
GDP per capita in the middle of that decade and sustaining that differential. China’s
growth spurt was due in part to its ability early on to attract FDI, while India had not yet
liberalized its foreign investment regime. In addition, if market size is taken into account
as with the figures in table 2, China still received significantly more FDI than India. But
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the demand factor alone is not very helpful in explaining this differential, as both had
very large demand potential.

2. Factor Conditions:
Much of the classical literature in international development notes that countries
with a relatively large pool of transportation and telecom infrastructure, technology and a
skilled labor force offer advantages and thus attract FDI.

Infrastructure:
The most common reason cited in the press and manager surveys for China’s lead
in FDI over India is better infrastructure. In India, infrastructure is seen as an
impediment to growth of the manufacturing sector, where gains made through low labor
costs are overshadowed by loses due to bottlenecks especially in power supply and
transportation (Walker 2006). Two related points provide perspective in this regard.
First, the differences in infrastructure perceived today did not always exist. In the early
1980s, infrastructure was underdeveloped in both countries, and by some measures was
superior in India (Patel and Bhattacharya, 2010, p.53). Second, from Porter’s
perspective, infrastructure development is endogenous, meaning that its development will
occur to meet the demands for it. An example would be Infosys owners threatening to
move their headquarters as a way to lobby the Indian government for a new airport in
Bangalore. Huang (2008, p.268) argues that China responded to the needs of foreign
investors once firms had been encouraged to invest. This process began in southern
China, just north of the border with Hong Kong, in the early 1980s. China began by
building infrastructure in special economic zones, partly because the conditions for
investment throughout China were very poor.
As a result, China’s physical infrastructure has improved significantly and while
its electricity supply and communications infrastructure remain weak, its physical
infrastructure with roads and railways is substantially better and has grown faster than
India’s. Since the early 1990s, India's growing economy has witnessed a rise in demand
for transport infrastructure and services. Most highways in India are underdeveloped
with narrow roads and a majority of India’s cities are not well connected nor do they have
access to all-weather roads. The dramatic increase in air traffic for both passengers and
cargo in recent years has placed a heavy strain on the country's major airports. While
12

India has only recently begun to take steps in this area, China’s physical infrastructure
has improved significantly due to massive government spending during the last three
decades.
Tables 3 and 4 present recent statistics comparing communication and
transportation infrastructure in the two countries. In India, fixed and mobile telephone
density is relatively low with mobile subscribers at about 21 for each 100 persons
nationwide while China is much higher at 42 subscribers per 100 persons. A comparison
of the internet infrastructure in the two countries shows that China has had a higher
percent of users and penetration of internet, but the percent of user growth was higher in
India between 2000 and 2008. In terms of Internet bandwidth and electric power
consumption, however, India lags behind China. India has 12 major and 187 minor and
intermediate ports along its more than 7,600 km long coastline. In comparison, China has
16 large scale ports along its eastern and southern border. India’s inland water
transportation, however, remains a challenge. In aviation, and roadways, China has made
major strides relative to India, with higher number of airports and doubling of roadways
in the recent years.

[Tables 3 and 4 here]

Based on data from the World Bank enterprise survey of infrastructure constraints
as perceived by firms, both nations have room for improvement especially in comparison
to OECD nations and, in most cases, compared to East Asia and Pacific nations as well.
For instance, the time taken to get an electricity connection is about the same in both
nations, while firms in India reported a greater loss due to electricity constraints. While a
slightly higher percentage of firms in India identify electricity as a major constraint, a
higher percentage of Chinese firms report transportation as being the major blockade in
doing business (World Bank Enterprise Survey).

Technology:
The Global Information Technology Forum’s report (World Economic Forum)
compares countries’ readiness with regard to technology. This is useful in comparing the
two nations in terms of their technology preparedness. The report discusses how
countries leverage information communication technology (ICT) for growth and
13

development using the Networked Readiness Index (NRI). Based on a mix of hard data
and firm surveys, the NRI is broken down into three components—environment,
readiness and usage. In the overall index, India outperformed China from 2002 to 2007,
but then China pulled ahead of India in the last two years of reported data (2008-09).
The components of the index indicate that India lags China in infrastructure but that the
market environment is better. The political and regulatory environment is also more
receptive in India for much of this decade. At the individual and business level, India
outranks China, but the Chinese government is more prepared for change than the Indian
government, according to these data. In usage of ICT, India lags behind China in all
three areas, which includes the individual, business and governmental areas.

Labor Force:
On average China has a larger workforce than India, both in terms of permanent
full time employees as well as temporary or seasonal employees (World Bank Enterprise
Surveys). This is largely due to the higher participation of women in the workforce in
China. However, while in China the percentage of workers who are unskilled is much
higher than in India—86 percent compared with 36—in terms of the absolute number of
skilled workers, the two countries are on par.
India has a younger workforce compared to China. Over 94.7 percent of the
population is less than 65 years old and over 30 percent are under 14. China has about
91 percent of the population under 65 but has only about 18 percent of the population that
are younger than 14. However, two factors that work against India is that it has a much
lower literacy rate than China (61 percent compared to 91 percent in China) and a smaller
urban population (29 percent compared to 43 percent) (World Databank).
While wage comparisons are difficult to make across nations, Ashenfelter and
Jurajda (2001) found that basic wage rates for India were lower than in China. Wei’s
(2005) results suggested that lower labor costs in India explain some of that country’s
FDI inflows. The Global Wage Report (ILO, 2008) data also indicate that wages on
average are lower in India than in China. Using a purchasing power parity exchange with
the US dollar, the minimum wage in India was 113 as compared to 204 in China as of
2007 or later. Between 2001 and 2007, the minimum wage in China grew over 8 percent
while in India it increased less than 2 percent (ILO, 2008, Table A2). Average real
wages grew in China over 9 percent between 1995 and 2000 and over 12 percent between
14

2001 and 2007. For the same time periods India’s average wages grew less than 2
percent.5 China’s new labor law, adopted in 2009 and implemented in January 2010, has
also reportedly added to labor costs since these data were collected.
Overall the comparison of factor conditions is mixed, with China ahead with
some and India ahead in others. Both countries have made major progress with
infrastructure, but weaknesses remain in both places (Patel and Bhattacharya 2010, Bai
and Qian 2010). India has a younger workforce, but with less literacy overall. Both
countries have relatively low wages for both skilled and unskilled labor. As a key
differentiator in the flow of FDI, it is difficult to argue that these factor conditions have
been the main variable, especially if we consider the flows of FDI since the early 1980s.

3. Firm Strategy, structure and rivalry:
A third part of Porter’s diamond emphasizes local conditions that affect firmrelated factors, i.e., how firms are created, organized and managed, and the benefits of
rivalry or competition. Ceteris paribus, if a country makes it easier for firms to enter the
markets and free competition exists, it attracts FDI. The pattern of rivalry at home also
shapes the process of expansion, corporate culture, innovation and growth for firms. In
terms of ease of entering the markets or doing business within these nations, China and
India appear fairly on par.
While China and India have been liberalizing and attempting to increase
competition in their home markets, foreign firms still face serious challenges in entering
both of these markets. Table 5 reports key indicators from the World Bank Enterprise
Surveys. Although there is some variation between China and India in terms of the
specific entry constraints reported in these surveys, overall neither country scores well.
While many more firms report having difficulty and needing to pay to obtain licenses and
permits in China than India, more firms in India report the need to pay gifts to get basic
things accomplished such as obtaining an import license, installing a phone and obtaining
access to electric power. Incidence of graft is higher in India, but high in both nations,
while firms identifying corruption as a major constraint is about the same in both
countries at about one quarter of the firms surveyed.

[Table 5 here]
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Another firm level issue that is influenced by local conditions is the mode of entry
of FDI, whereby the modes of expansion and the options available within each country
attract FDI differently. The relationship between mode of FDI choice and the nation’s
competitive environment has been examined in recent literature (e.g., Mattoo, Olarreagaz
and Saggi 2001, Muller 2006). The preferred choice of mode of entry is often a trade-off
between technology transfer and market structure and competition in the host nation. The
choice of affiliate ownership structure can be very complex since it is contingent on
national, industrial, organizational and project factors (Luo, 2001). The pattern of rivalry
and the level and ease of entering these markets are reflected in the modes of FDI that
these nations promote. If companies are choosing between Greenfield, joint ventures and
merger and acquisition (M&A) investments as the mode for FDI, the preferred mode
typically depends on the suitability of targets, the competitive situation and other
characteristics specific to the industry in question. While mode of entry in itself may not
suffice to explain the FDI differential within the two nations, if more firms enter into one
nation versus the other in a particular form, it may be one indicator of whether firm entry
constraints or some other factor is affecting the FDI flow differently in one nation as
compared with the other (Thursby and Thursby, 2006).6
Greenfield investments are increasingly common in R&D expansions abroad
(UNCTAD). They are attractive since they bring in new equity capital investments and
create jobs in the host nation. Based on data from UNCTAD from 2002 to 2004, China
saw 581 Greenfield investments in 2002 that more than doubled the following year to
1299 and increased further to 1529 by 2004.7 In sharp contrast, India had less than half
of China’s investments for the corresponding year with 250 Greenfield investments for
FY 2002, which grew to 457 in FY 2003 and 685 the following year, FY 2004.
While globally, joint ventures and strategic alliances are increasingly common
particularly in the R&D area (Thursby and Thursby, 2006), joint ventures in China and
India have not been popular and may not help in explaining the differential in FDI due to
firm entry constraints caused by mode of entry restrictions. Based on data from SDC
(Thomson SDC, 2010) on joint ventures in India and China, excluding same country joint
ventures, in India from 1985 to 2009 there were very few joint ventures—5 from
Singapore and 4 each from the UK and USA. For China, between 1983 and 2009, there
were only 131 joint ventures. Hong Kong, Singapore and the U.S. dominated the joint
ventures with China.
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If an acquisition results in advancing market positioning and some R&D activities
are included in the takeover deal, M&A may be favored over joint ventures and strategic
alliances (UNCTAD). Cross-border M&As generally represent the fastest means of
building up a strong position in a new market, gaining market power, and indeed, market
dominance and competitive strength. In terms of firm structure and competition, cross
border mergers and acquisitions appear to have been the most attractive entry mode for
both nations. Based on the SDC data on mergers and acquisitions, in China there were a
total of 10 M&A transactions (1 from within China) in the 1980s while India witnessed
25 M&As (11 of them were among Indian companies) in the same decade. The 1990s
witnessed a 116 fold increase to 1,049 M&As in China from outside nations, while India
witnessed a 52 fold increase to 738 M&As for the same period. While the 1990s saw a
boom in the mergers and acquisitions markets with a continued rapid increase from East
Asia, Europe and the United States, the pace slowed down in the 2000s compared to the
earlier decade. India had a four-fold increase in the cross border M&A market and a fivefold increase was witnessed in the Chinese M&A scene in the 2000s.
In sum, both India and China appear to present similar challenges to foreign
investors with respect to modes of entry. Greenfield investment became a viable option
late in both countries; joint ventures have not been very common in either market; and
both countries have benefitted about the same from M&A activity. Hence differences in
local conditions affecting firm level factors are not very powerful in explaining the larger
FDI flows to China as compared with India.

4. Related and Supporting Industries:
Porter stated that competitive supplier industries can provide “efficient, early,
rapid, and preferential access to inputs,” which are basic production needs (1998a) More
linkages within an industry attract more FDI, ceteris paribus. With the advent of
outsourcing and global production networks, these linkages, both forward and backward,
become a critical and essential catalyst for FDI attraction. Porter described these clusters
as geographic concentrations of interconnected companies and institutions in a given
industry or area (Porter 1998b). He argued that the enduring competitive advantages in a
global economy are often heavily local, arising from concentrations of highly specialized
skills, knowledge, institutions and rivals, related businesses and sophisticated customers.
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These clusters could be horizontal or vertical in nature and indicate the presence of
support industries that could assist in the supply chain process thus creating competitive
advantage which would attract FDI.8
Similar to clusters, networks are alliances of firms that work together towards an
economic goal. They can be established between firms within clusters but also exist
outside clusters. Networks can be horizontal and vertical. Horizontal networks are built
between firms that compete for the same market, such as a group of producers
establishing a joint retail shop. Vertical networks are alliances between firms belonging
to different levels of the same value chain, such as a buyer assisting its suppliers for
upgrading (UNIDO).
Many studies have focused on the development of clusters and production
networks in East Asia (e.g., Ernst & Kim 2002, Naughton 1997, Sohn 2002, Chen and
Liu 1998, Chen et al. 2007, Gaulier et al. 2009, Ando and Kimura 2003, Saxenian 2002,
Yusuf et al. 2008, Guruswamy and Singh 2010). These studies support the argument that
China’s manufacturing advantage has come about partly because of its
interconnectedness with the global supply chain. The large number of supply clusters in
China has contributed significantly to the nation’s manufacturing competitiveness, both
because of competition (or rivalry in Porter’s terms) and because of the spillover benefits
from the agglomeration of industry. Further, these firms in China are globally
connected, which helps them with upgrading and expansion opportunities. While this
process has been concentrated in southern China because of the early establishment of the
special economic zones in the south, other parts of the country are also now linked, such
as the Beijing-Tianjin corridor and the Yangzi Valley area from Shanghai to Nanjing to
the west.
India also has clusters and global linkages, but the historical development has
been quite different. In India domestically-oriented, family-owned conglomerates have
been in existence for a long time. According to a UNIDO survey of Indian Small Scale
Industries (SSI) clusters undertaken in 1996, there were 350 SSI clusters and
approximately 2000 rural and artisan based clusters. It was estimated that these clusters
contributed 60% of the manufactured exports from India.9

In addition to the more

traditional small scale rural manufacturing clusters in the clothing sector, India has also
developed significant global linkages to software services and auto manufacturing
(Gereffi and Guler 2010, Basant 2008, Gregory et al. 2009).
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Despite such achievements, the majority of the Indian clusters share significant
constraints such as technological obsolescence, relatively poor product quality,
information deficiencies, poor market linkages and inadequate management systems.
They are also focused on the domestic market and poorly linked to global supply and
marketing networks. This is a major difference as compared with China, and is essential
for understanding the FDI differential.10 One indicator of the consequence of this
difference is that China’s share of exports in 2008 that were classified as high-tech was
24 percent as compared with India’s 2 percent (World Databank).

5. The role of government and institutions:
In addition to the core diamond framework, Porter also considers the role of
government and institutions, and chance, in understanding the determinants of
competitiveness. Porter emphasized the role of government in advancing a nation’s
agenda in economic development and competitiveness. Government is critical for
competitiveness since it sets policy, but other supporting institutions such as the legal
system are critical for sustaining competitive advantage for any nation. The private
sector is also a crucial actor in improving competitiveness and in influencing economic
policy since they are most impacted by the investment environment.
Doing business in either country has its bureaucratic hurdles. The two countries
require about the same time and effort to start a business, and they have different and yet
equally difficult firm entry constraints (World Bank Enterprise Survey). India has a
democratic representative government with stronger legal and financial systems, more
political freedom, unrestricted information flow, and a more established private sector.
India was also an original member of the WTO and a member of GATT from the
beginning. China has an underdeveloped legal system and joined WTO only in 2001, has
less economic freedom, controlled access to information and questionable protection of
private property. Yet even with these apparent relative institutional advantages in India,
much more FDI has flowed to China.
Policy is the key here. While India’s institutions may be stronger, the
ambivalence in government policy has affected the environment for FDI in terms of
programmatic initiatives adopted to promote or impede business development. For
example, India has adopted public-private partnerships in infrastructure development
programs, while in China more than 90 percent of the infrastructure development has
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been through government funding. In India multinationals often build their own
campuses with self contained power generation because the public supply is inadequate.
In China, partnering with local government and/or locating in a development zone have
been the main routes to access to utilities. In addition, as discussed in Henley (2004),
local governments in China were given incentives to attract FDI while this was not the
case in India.
As Meredith (2007) notes, while India is democratic and China is authoritarian,
capitalistic India is often anti-business and communist China is usually pro-business.
China's leadership sees economic growth as the key to retaining its hold on power,
increasing influence in the world and strengthening the military to cope with threats to
national security. In contrast, fifty years of socialist dogma and policies have left India
with political and bureaucratic hurdles that constrain rewards for enterprise, initiative and
merit on the one hand, and the operation of the price mechanism on the other. Chinese
leaders, as part of their longer-term strategic vision, have focused on promoting English
language and information technology skills, backed by the necessary telecommunications
and power infrastructure, while in India the IT sector’s success is largely attributed to its
nature and speed that caused it to escape government control and regulation (Thakur
2003; Yardley 2011). Hence, in China firms must work on developing good government
relations while in India it is best to avoid government. Both have their drawbacks.
So far we have explored all but one aspect of Porter’s model. While, demand,
factor conditions, and firm strategy, structure and rivalry show differences between China
and India, these are not significant enough to explain the very large FDI differential. The
factors tied to related and supporting industries, and the role of government and
institutions, begin to tell the story. China’s leaders decided to exploit the global market
place for development about a decade earlier than India, and designed policy to explicitly
attract and serve foreign firms. Clusters of industries with strong linkages to the global
economy were also formed earlier in China, and thus became deeper as a result. We turn
now to the additional factor that has not been fully recognized in the literature—‘the
Chance Factor’— that China was in the ‘right place at the right time’.
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6. The Chance Factor: timing and location
The last of Porter’s factors that gives a nation competitive advantage is not easily
quantifiable. Recognizing that not all business success is based on careful planning and
brilliant strategies, Porter includes “chance” as a factor that may create competitive
advantage for nations. We argue that China’s success with FDI as compared to India can
be largely attributed to ‘chance’ being a catalyst; i.e., being located at the right
geographic proximity and adopting reforms at a propitious time.
At the time that China began to open to international markets in the early 1980s,
East Asian development had advanced to the point where companies were seeking lower
costs. The processes of urbanization and industrialization in East Asia drove up labor
and land costs. Industrialization increased demand for factory labor, while urbanization
gradually drained the countryside of underemployed, low-paid agricultural labor that had
provided armies of workers willing to labor for low (but still higher than agricultural)
wages in the early stages of industrialization. Growing demand combined with limited
supply of labor had begun to drive up wages. Rising living standards and democratic
transitions in South Korea and Taiwan in the late 1980s further added to labor militancy
and demands for higher wages. Similar dynamics operated regarding land costs. The
East Asian countries were all densely populated with mountainous geography. Land near
transportation lines was increasingly expensive. Growing environmental consciousness
and consequent government regulation led to further cost increases. And the rise of the
value of the yen in the mid-1980s added substantially to Japan’s costs. In highly
competitive global markets, these rising costs began to hurt the demand for East Asian
goods, threatening to undermine continued growth. One response to this competitive
challenge was to shift labor intensive, and sometimes polluting, manufacturing operations
from these home countries to some place abroad. Taiwan, South Korea, Japan and
especially Hong Kong are located on China’s doorstep. China began encouraging FDI in
the early 1980s, and within a short time period, low-end manufacturing production
moved to the special economic zones in southern China. Hong Kong played a pivotal
role providing expertise, a legal environment and logistics in those early days when
China was just beginning to develop these aspects of a business environment.
Unlike China in the 1980s, India had no such external impetus to push forward its
FDI agenda. India’s FDI has not been concentrated from any one nation or region. Some
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studies have identified overseas Chinese as an important source of FDI into China (Gao,
2003, Lo & Liu 2009) whereas this has been more limited in India (Lall, 2001).11
Saxenian (2002) emphasizes the linkages with nationals with specialized education and
experience that allow the formation of global professional networks that promote new
industries and innovations. Her study shows that these networks are more developed visà-vis China than India. These factors are consistent with East Asian companies taking
advantage of new opportunities within China as a substantial portion of the FDI came
from Hong Kong and Taiwan. Well over half of China’s FDI has gone into
manufacturing, while in India FDI has concentrated in the power and telecom sectors
(Henley, 2004). The character of China’s exports—the fact that over 50 percent of
China’s exports are produced by firms with foreign investment, that the value-added of
these exports tended to start low and rise, and that final sales are heavily weighted
towards the major developed markets of the north America and the E.U.—is evidence of
China’s role in the Asian production networks (Sung 2007, Lemoine and Unal-Kesenci
2004).
Consistent with this argument, Wu et al. (2006) argue that China’s manufacturing
cost advantage over other nations was not merely due to the low cost of labor but more so
because of the existence of supply clusters and China’s geographic proximity to these
global production networks. They argue that if labor costs were the main reason, other
nations such as Vietnam and Zimbabwe should have benefited, since they have far lower
costs than China. They also point out that most of China’s production capacity for export
goods is located in the four or five eastern provinces in the coastal regions where wages
and cost of living and prices for production are usually the highest in the country. The
Chinese advantage goes beyond labor costs and is specifically reflected in the developed
value chain, including sourcing for manufacturing, logistics, warehousing, and storage.
There has been nothing comparable in India until very recently. Over half of the
FDI flowing to India is funneled via Mauritius (Wei 2005), but this is for tax purposes
rather than for economic reasons. India began opening to global markets in earnest only
in 1991. By then China had a decade of experience with how to best attract FDI with
minimal political and economic backlash. This put China in a good position to absorb the
rising private capital flows that occurred during the 1990s. With improving production
quality and expanding clusters of capabilities with supporting services, China became an
agglomeration of low cost manufacturing that then encouraged other firms to follow.
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This was an historical moment for equipment manufacturing, especially in
telecommunications and information technology, which most likely will not be replicated
elsewhere.
China’s trading and investment partners provide additional evidence to support
the East Asian production networks proposition. China’s exports in 1990 were heavily
dependent on East Asia, with 61.9 percent being sold there (table 6). Hong Kong was the
largest with 43.3 percent of China’s export market share. Japan followed with 14.7
percent. Imports from East Asia made up 16.2 percent of the total, with Japan being the
largest import partner at 14.2 percent. By 2008 East Asia’s share had fallen to 29 percent
for exports and 24.6 percent for imports. In line with this, Chia (2007) analyzed Japan’s
FDI to Asia noting that the largest flows went to China, outstripping flows to ASEAN4
plus Singapore, although ASEAN has caught up in 2006.

[Table 6 here]

In contrast, in 1990, India was still largely following the bilateral trade process
with rudimentary building production networks, if any. As see in Table 6, 14.2 percent
of India’s exports were sold to Japan and Hong Kong, and another 1.7 percent went to
Singapore. The U.S. was India’s largest export destination with 15.1 percent. Exports to
China represented only 0.1 percent. The U.S. was also India’s top country for imports
with 11.0 percent while East Asia made up 11.9 percent. By 2008, India’s exports to East
Asia were 21.6 percent, with 11.1 percent going to China. China was India’s largest
country for imports in 2008, with 11.9 percent. East Asia together represented 22.1
percent. The trends indicate that East Asia has grown in importance for India, but largely
because of its growing trade with China.
Trade and foreign investment tend to be closely tied, and in recent years this has
been compounded by the growing share of intermediate goods in total world trade
(Hanson et al. 2005). While cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&As) is only one
mode of inward FDI, it provides evidence of a trend in both direction and magnitude of
FDI. Data on the value of cross-border M&A transactions over the three decades is
presented in table 7 showing that China received about two and half times more capital
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via cross-border M&A transactions than India for the three decades ($243 million as
opposed to $104 million). While none of the East Asian nations and Japan invested any
M&A dollars in the 1980s with India, China received $74 million; $10 million from
Japan and $50 million from UK and $2 million from HK. China received a large boost in
capital of 453 times in value terms from the 1980s to the 1990s. This we argue made all
the difference since it helped build China-centric production networks that moved East
Asian trade to the forefront for the next two decades following the 1980s.
By the mid 1990s, as China began to expand and become increasingly more
attractive as a location for global production networks, the push for cross-border M&As
was welcomed in China. With the East Asian tigers and Japan, China’s foreign invested
export industry became a key driver of China’s development. As reflected in the
numbers, China’s inward FDI in the form of cross-border M&As increased impressively
from 73 million in the 1980s to 32 billion in the 1990s. The majority of this FDI was
from East Asia, Japan and the U.S. For India, while the 1990s was also a period of
liberalization, with limited production networks, India’s cross-border M&A grew to $5
billion in the 1990s, an increase of 60 times compared to the 1980s. However, the FDI in
form of cross border M&As was not weighted toward one or a group of nations as in the
case of China.
The 2000s also saw a further increase in cross-border M&A dollars into China but
the pace slowed relative to the earlier decade and the differential between the two nations
narrowed. While China continued to receive most of the M&A dollars from Hong Kong,
U.S., Japan and Singapore, during this decade other nations also poured dollars via
M&As into China. India saw a larger proportionate increase in the 2000s and grew about
19 fold from the 1990s to $99 billion. As in other decades, India’s M&A dollars were
not concentrated from any one country or region. In sum, these trends underscore the
importance of East Asian trade and investment in China’s development story.

[Table 7 here]
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Implications
This evidence of trade and FDI lend support for our hypothesis that China had the
right combination of economic history and timing that enabled its building of alliances
with other nations in the form of production networks. This process began a decade
earlier than India positioning China as a better place to receive FDI. China’s early entry
into East Asian production networks was happenstance due to its geographical location,
and while opening to the global economy by establishing special economic zones was a
conscious policy, the timing of it was coincidental.12 Together, the timing and location of
building these alliances has been a key factor pushing China ahead of India in terms of
FDI.
One view of this result is that while India’s lower volume of FDI compared to
China may not be worrisome in itself, FDI as a vehicle for technology transfer and a
mechanism for accessing global markets provides an advantage in terms of market
positioning. FDI helps tie local companies into international production networks that
bring together component suppliers, assemblers, supply chain managers and buyers.
Domestic firms can increase their productivity by accessing technology and management
practices from foreign partners, which enhances their international competitiveness
(Ernest and Kim 2002). A recent contribution to this line of reasoning is Breznitz and
Murphee (2011) who argue that China’s process innovation capability is due to just these
types of connections to global firms. Following our argument, India would not have the
same innovation dynamics, at least in manufacturing.
Another view is that the now more developed India perhaps does not need FDI as
a conduit to development as it might have in the past. An empirical study by Kose et al.
(2007) suggests that emerging market economies have become less tied to the
industrialized economies because they have been decoupling. In recent years India’s
former self-reliance resulting in a strong domestic sector seems to be paying off and its
emphasis on ‘homegrown’ entrepreneurship is poised to become its key ingredient for
economic success. India has managed to spawn a number of reputable companies able to
compete internationally with the best of Europe and the United States. Many of these
firms are in knowledge-based industries, such as software giants Infosys and Wipro and
Ranbaxy and Dr Reddy's Labs in the pharmaceutical and biotechnology sectors, just to
name a few. Further, for the emerging economies, intra-group trade became relatively
more important than trade with industrial countries, while the group’s economic
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structures have become increasingly similar. Another recent paper by Kaur (2009)
proposes that the statistical patterns of convergence and decoupling may be analogous to
the flying geese pattern of shifting comparative advantage, with more advanced
economies moving up in sophistication and passing the baton to other emerging
economies. She argues that there is a change in the degree of vertical specialization in
global production networks, with supply chain management now allowing different
production stages to be spread across more locations. India’s strength in services has
created a competitive advantage in the coordination of these activities across firms and
across nations (Ghani, Grover and Kharas 2011).
Decoupling has also received a lot of attention with respect to China in the wake
of the 2008-09 global financial crisis. If China can grow without the U.S., in particular,
then China can be instrumental in pulling the U.S., and the global economy, out of
recession. Much discussion has focused on the need for China to shift to domestic
demand as its engine of growth with less reliance on exports, especially after the decline
in demand from the developed economies in the wake of the crisis (e.g., Qi and Prime
2009). Official policy in China recognizes this as a goal, and steps have been taken. To
date, however, China’s exports continue to grow, as does its foreign exchange reserves.
India is much less reliant on the global economy for its growth, and hence has weathered
the crisis well.
By the 2000s, the FDI differential between China and India continued but inward
investment to India increased quickly (Table 1). Over the decade India’s economy
increasingly integrated with the East Asian economies, giving it some of the advantages
that China has enjoyed for some time. Infrastructure has improved in India, but more
needs to be done. Perhaps now the pressure to invest in infrastructure will be sufficient
to ease these constraints. India’s higher growth has stimulated rising incomes there with
new domestic market opportunities for domestic and foreign firms alike.
As the two nations grow and knowledge transfer diffuses into these economies, one
can expect new symbiotic relationships with other nations in the new age of strategic
alliances.

For example, Japan has begun to view India as a place with substantial

investment and manufacturing potential. Due to very limited political and economic
history with India, Japan's latest approach to India has so far also been reciprocated and
well-received by Indian businesses that have traditionally been looking west.

India’s

increased trade with Japan, and East Asia generally, in part reflects this new direction of
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global ties. Secondly, China’s FDI structure is likely to change as its networks evolve. It
may be, for example, that the next stage of global production will see some FDI leaving
China because of rising costs, and more FDI going to India to take advantage of India’s
high-skilled knowledge workers. Thirdly, companies from both countries have become
multinationals in their own right, investing in many markets around the world. Finally, at
the same time, India and China are becoming closer economically, with China representing
India’s largest import market and the second largest export market in 2008. How policies
change in these two nations’ as they go forward with cooperation while also competing
remains to be seen.

Conclusion
This paper identifies reasons for the large differential in FDI received by China
over India. The FDI differential is a puzzle since the two nations are geographically
similar in that they are large, populous continental economies that have gone through
similar stages of transition and development over the past three decades. We address this
issue by identifying factors that attract FDI within the context of national competitiveness
as laid out by Porter. We first examine the four parts of Porter’s diamond. Differences
are established but none of these four stands out as obvious explanations for such a large
FDI differential.
We argue that the differential is largely due to China’s fortuitous ‘location and
timing’ that placed China in the center of the building of production networks with East
Asian investment beginning in the early 1980s. Alongside, resolute government policy
and programmatic initiatives adopted to promote business development in China (as
opposed to India) helped strengthen China’s competitiveness earlier and more
successfully than India. A case in point is the establishment of the special economic
zones in southern China in the early 1980s that provided incentives, labor and
infrastructure for foreign firms to locate there for low-cost, labor-intensive
manufacturing. Simultaneously, East Asian firms were central to the manufacturing
supply chain, especially driven by electronic equipment, thus, moving to China was
geographically and culturally convenient. This placed China in the center of the East
Asian building production network; an opportunity that India missed at the time.
Our analysis covers the key conditions that are typically addressed in the
literature, but we are limited by the lack of systematic econometric data that would allow
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us to measure the relative importance of our variables. In this sense understanding the
attractiveness of these two economies to FDI covers many “eclectic” reasons that
Dunning described so well. In sum, China and India have developed in very different
ways and so a systematic comparison will yield multiple reasons for differences in
results. What is clear is that China has attracted and utilized much more FDI than India,
and it seems unlikely that India will catch up in this respect, at least for some time to
come. At this point we cannot say which path will be the most successful over the longrun.
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Table 1: Inward FDI flows: China and India 1970-2008 (US $ millions)

YEAR

China as
India as
FDI
% of
China as
% of
Developing
Developing % of Developing
economies:
Economies World Economies India as % of
Asia
World FDI
in Asia
FDI
in Asia
World FDI

China

India

1970

0

45

854

13,346

0.0

0.0

5.3

0.3

1971

0

48

796

14,282

0.0

0.0

6.0

0.3

1972

0

18

1,423

14,933

0.0

0.0

1.3

0.1

1973

0

38

1,648

20,646

0.0

0.0

2.3

0.2

1974

0

57

-1,665

24,127

0.0

0.0

-3.4

0.2

1975

0

85

5,265

26,567

0.0

0.0

1.6

0.3

1976

0

51

1,605

22,002

0.0

0.0

3.2

0.2

1977

0

-36

3,031

27,139

0.0

0.0

-1.2

-0.1

1978

0

18

3,919

34,358

0.0

0.0

0.5

0.1

1979

0

49

2,146

42,292

0.0

0.0

2.3

0.1

1980

57

79

543

54,076

10.5

0.1

14.6

0.1

1981

265

92

13,329

69,567

2.0

0.4

0.7

0.1

1982

430

72

17,136

58,059

2.5

0.7

0.4

0.1

1983

916

6

10,894

50,268

8.4

1.8

0.1

0.0

1984

1,419

19

11,557

56,839

12.3

2.5

0.2

0.0

1985

1,956

106

5,419

55,887

36.1

3.5

2.0

0.2

1986

2,244

118

9,299

86,345

24.1

2.6

1.3

0.1

1987

2,314

212

13,426

136,548

17.2

1.7

1.6

0.2

1988

3,194

91

18,058

162,834

17.7

2.0

0.5

0.1

1989

3,393

252

16,992

196,617

20.0

1.7

1.5

0.1

1990

3,487

237

22,660

207,273

15.4

1.7

1.0

0.1

1991

4,366

75

24,164

155,686

18.1

2.8

0.3

0.0

1992

11,008

252

32,956

166,594

33.4

6.6

0.8

0.2

1993

27,515

532

56,022

222,408

49.1

12.4

0.9

0.2

1994

33,767

974

68,289

256,785

49.4

13.1

1.4

0.4

1995

37,521

2,151

80,114

341,144

46.8

11.0

2.7

0.6

1996

41,726

2,525

94,186

390,443

44.3

10.7

2.7

0.6

1997

45,257

3,619

105,814

485,808

42.8

9.3

3.4

0.7

1998

45,463

2,633

95,302

705,330

47.7

6.4

2.8

0.4

1999

40,319

2,168

111,537

1,078,606

36.1

3.7

1.9

0.2

2000

40,715

3,585

148,561

1,381,675

27.4

2.9

2.4

0.3

2001

46,878

5,472

113,936

820,430

41.1

5.7

4.8

0.7

2002

52,743

5,627

101,185

629,675

52.1

8.4

5.6

0.9

2003

53,505

4,323

116,928

565,160

45.8

9.5

3.7

0.8

2004

60,630

5,771

172,910

734,892

35.1

8.3

3.3

0.8

2005

72,406

7,606

213,751

973,329

33.9

7.4

3.6

0.8

2006

72,715

20,336

282,127

1,461,074

25.8

5.0

7.2

1.4

2007

83,521

25,127

331,425

1,978,838

25.2

4.2

7.6

1.3

2008

108,312

41,554

387,828

1,697,353

27.9

6.4

10.7

2.4

2009

95,000

34613

301367

1114189

31.5

8.5

11.5

3.1
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Source: UNCTAD, WIR 2009

Table 2: FDI performance Index

Year

Inward FDI Performance Index

1988-1990
1990-1992
1992-1994
1994-1996
1996-1998
1998-2000
2000-2002
2002-2004
2004-2006
2005-2007
Source: UNCTAD, 2008

China
scores
1.033
2.162
2.162
4.667
2.761
1.198
1.331
2.134
1.320
0.986

India
scores
0.066
0.088
0.088
0.467
0.417
0.155
0.215
0.410
0.615
0.629

Inward FDI Potential Index
China
scores
0.176
0.196
0.190
0.225
0.251
0.255
0.273
0.289
0.304
0.304

India
scores
0.120
0.138
0.152
0.165
0.167
0.156
0.159
0.166
0.163
0.163
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Table 3: Telecommunications infrastructure
Country

China

Electric
power
consumption
(kWh per
capita)
2006

Internet
access to
information

Internet
users
(per 100
people)
2008

User
growth
(20002008)

Users
(%)
in
Asia

Penetration
(%
Population)

Personal
computers
(per 100
people)
2006

Accessibility
of digital
content

Internet
bandwidth
(hard
data)

2041

controlled

16

12.244

0.453

0.224

5.6

5.53

4.79

3

4.5

0.31

India
503
open
7
15.2
0.123
0.071
Source: UNCTAD, 2008, Internet World Stats, 2008, Global Information Forum, 2009

Cellular
(in
millions)

547.286
(2007)
362.3
(2009)

Mobile
phone
subscribers
(per 100
people)
2008
42
21

Main
lines in
use (in
millions)

365.4
(2007)
37.75
(2009)

37

Table 4: Transportation infrastructure

Airports

Airports with
paved
runways

Heliports

Railways

Roadways

Ports and terminals1

China
1,930,544 km
16 major and about 130
(2008)
477
413
35
75,438 km
(2005)
open to foreign ships
China
3,583,715 km
(2010)
502
502
48
77,834 km
(2007)
India
3,316,452 km
12 major and 187 minor
(2008)
345
251
30
63,221 km
(2006)
and intermediate
India
3,3320,410 km
(2010)
352
249
40
64,015 km
(2009)
Source: CIA World Fact book, 2008, 2010;
1: Wikipedia http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ports_in_India/;
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transportation_in_the_People%27s_Republic_of_China
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Table 5: Firm Entry constraints

Country

All countries
East Asia &
Pacific
OECD
South Asia
China
India

Country

All countries
East Asia &
Pacific
OECD
South Asia
China
India

% of Firms Identifying
Business Licensing
and Permits as Major
Constraint***

% of Firms Expected
to Pay Informal
Payment to Public
Officials (to Get
Things Done)

% of Firms Expected
to Give Gifts to Get an
Operating License

% of Firms Expected
to Give Gifts to Get an
Import License

% of Firms Expected
to Give Gifts to Get an
Electrical Connection

% of Firms Expected
to Give Gifts to Get a
Phone Connection

15.4

27.1

16.2

15.7

16.9

11.7

10.3

31.1

20.7

20.6

21.6

11.6

9.7

12.6

..

..

..

..

11.9

34.7

20.7

20.5

31.9

22.7

21.33

72.57

8.49

10.9

5.61

5.51

9.92

47.49

52.45

45.99

39.63

20

Incidence of Graft
index

% of Firms Expected
to Give Gifts In
Meetings With Tax
Officials

% of Firms Expected
to Give Gifts to Secure
a Government
Contract**

Value of Gift Expected
to Secure Government
Contract (% of
Contract)

% of Firms Identifying
Corruption as a Major
Constraint***

% of Firms expressing
that a Typical Firm
Reports less than
100% of Sales for Tax
Purposes

14.8

16.7

28.5

2.3

36.1

53

20.8

22

34.6

4.1

26.6

63.8

..

28.3

15.6

0.4

8.1

36.2

23.2

30.6

31.4

1.5

33.8

36.3

8.38

38.74

27.04

1.25

27.33

49.45

36.57

52.32

23.79

0.96

25.65

59.24

Source: World Bank enterprise surveys
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Table 6: Export and Import statistics

Exports of
Commodities

China
$1.485 trillion f.o.b. (2008)
Electrical and other machinery,
including data processing
equipment, apparel, textiles, iron
and steel, optical and medical
equipment

Export partners 1990

Hong Kong (43.3%); Japan
(14.7%); U.S. (8.5%); Germany
(3.3%); Singapore (3.2%); Korea
(0.7%)

Export partners 2008

U.S. (18.4%); Hong Kong
(13.6%); Japan (8.1%); Korea
(5.1%); Germany (4.1%)

India
$187.3 billion f.o.b. (2008)
Petroleum products, textile
goods, gems and jewelry,
engineering goods,
chemicals, leather
manufactures
U.S. (15.1%); Japan (9.3%);
Germany (7.6%); U.K.
(6.2%); Hong Kong (3.1%);
Italy (2.8%); UAE (2.6%);
PRC (0.1%)
U.S. (13.1%); PRC (11.1%);
UAE (8.9%); Singapore
(4.3%); Hong Kong (3.7%);
U.K. (3.7%)

Imports

$1.191 trillion f.o.b. (2008)

$299.4 billion f.o.b. (2008)

Imports of
Commodities

Electrical and other machinery, oil
and mineral fuels, optical and
medical equipment, metal ores,
plastics, organic chemicals

Imports Partners 1990

Japan (14.2%); U.S. (12.2%);
Germany (5.5%); Australia
(2.5%); Singapore (1.6%);
Malaysia (1.6%)

Import Partners 2008

Japan (12.5%); Korea (10.2%);
U.S.(6.8%); Germany (4.6%);
Australia (3.1%); Malaysia (2.9%)

Exports

Crude oil, machinery, gems,
fertilizer, chemicals
U.S. (11.0%); Germany
(7.7%); Japan (7.5%); U.K.
(6.9%); UAE (4.0%);
Australia (3.2%); Singapore
(2.9%)
PRC (11.9%); U.S. (6.9%);
Singapore (4.5%); Germany
(4.4%); Australia (4.0%);
Japan (2.9%); UAE (2.9%);
Korea (2.8%)

Source: CIA World Fact book for major traded commodities and Asia Development Bank,

www.adb.org/statistics, for trade partners and trade totals for 2008.
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Table 7: Value of Cross Border Mergers and Acquisition Transactions ($ millions)
INDIA 1985-2009

CHINA 1983-2009

Total
1990s

Total
2000s

Grand
Total
1980-2009

Australia

63

468

531

Bahrain

2

379

Belgium

1

Canada

104

China
Denmark

Country of
Origin

Total
1980s

Total
1990s

Total
2000s

Grand
Total
1980-2009

Australia

416

2,990

3,405

381

Belgium

2

1,158

1,159

188

189

Canada

266

1,551

1,817

95

199

France

4

3,076

3,079

25

8

32

Germany

23

3,091

3,114

11

102

113

Hong Kong

2

24,008

101,274

125,284

Japan

10

583

5,283

5,877

-

1,842

1,842

Country of
Origin

Total
1980s

Finland

13

110

123

France

184

2,762

2,946

Luxembourg

Germany

362

1,694

2,056

Malaysia

610

1,355

1,965

Hong Kong

364

1,340

1,705

Netherlands

34

1,337

1,372

Italy

246

524

770

Japan

130

9,147

9,277

Singapore

Malaysia

34

5,150

5,185

Mauritius

146

7,187

Netherlands

35

Singapore

248

South Africa
South Korea

1,512

7,901

9,423

1,598

16,188

17,786

South Korea

9

3,631

3,640

7,334

Spain

5

2,338

2,343

1,211

1,246

Switzerland

183

973

1,156

6,041

6,289

58

1,779

1,836

2

8,843

8,845

Taiwan
United
Kingdom

91

62

153

United States

353

213

600

Total

Sweden

69

492

562

Switzerland

59

1,215

1,273

Supranational

34

Taiwan
Thailand
United
Kingdom

51

United States
Unknown
Other

44

44

17

46

62

440

25,112

25,603

1,854

19,282

21,136

111

345

456

77

6,960

7,036

TOTAL

84

5,039

99,022

104,145

India

216

9,734

104,600

114,550

Grand Total

300

14,773

203,622

218,695

Other

10

50

617

10,177

10,844

3,046

43,809

46,855

73

32,973

209,752

242,797

China

1

10,172

352,515

362,689

Grand Total

74

43,145

562,267

605,486

Source: Thomson SDC International Mergers and Acquisitions Database 2010.
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Endnotes
1

See Prime (2009) for a review of the literature comparing China and India in terms of economic performance.

2

Along similar lines, G.P. Hinduja, President of the Hinduja Group when asked about the lack of investment by expats
in India, stated unequivocally that the general lack of interest in manufacturing units in India by Non Resident Indians
(NRIs) is because of bureaucratic hurdles and the lack of transparency and accountability at all levels. In addition, he
noted that the NRIs are not provided the same infrastructure and network that local industrialists enjoy
(http://archives.digitaltoday.in/businesstoday/netexcl/netex2106/hinduja.htm).
3

The eight variables that are included are: rate of GDP growth, per capita GDP, share of exports in GDP, telephone
lines per 1,000 inhabitants, commercial energy use per capita, share of R&D expenditures in gross national income,
share of tertiary students in the population and political and commercial country risk.
4

In order to compare these indices more systematically, a simple t-test of difference in means and a Wilcoxin test of
medians of the rankings and scores of the indices was done on the data in table 2. These results confirm that China has
had statistically significant differences in inward FDI performance and potential compared to India.
At least one estimate published in 2007 had India’s wages a bit higher at $1.60 per hour compared with $1.50 in
China (KPMG report cited in note 4, Gereffi & Guler 2010).
5

6

A recent paper by Thursby and Thursby (2006) presents results from over 200 multinational companies across 15
industries regarding the factors that influence decisions on where to conduct research and Development (R&D). They
note that for companies locating in emerging economies, the most important attraction was the growth potential in the
market followed by the quality of R&D personnel. Poor quality of intellectual property protection was a detractor.
7

Source: UNCTAD, based on information from OCO Consulting, LOCO monitor website (www.locomonitor.com).
Note that these investments include new (Greenfield) and expansion FDI projects, both announced and realized.
8

Horizontal clusters are characterized by units which process the raw material to produce and subsequently market the
finished product themselves. Vertical clusters are where the operations required in producing the finished product are
carried out separately by different units, most of which are SMEs.
9

For examples of such clusters in India, see UNIDO at http://www.unido.org/index.php?id=o4308

In a search of journal articles in the EconLit database since 1989 for the words “production networks” in the abstract,
out of the 218 items found only three had any reference to India. Most focused on China, Taiwan and East Asia
generally, while a few dealt with Eastern Europe, the EU and the U.S. A recent book deals with labor and production
networks in India, but the focus is on the effect of global production networks on wages and working conditions within
connected firms in India (Posthuma and Nathan 2010).
10

While Lo and Liu (2009) argue that without overseas Chinese investments, China’s FDI-GDP ratio is almost the
same as that of India on average in the 1990s (Lo and Liu, 2007, page 244), there are two things to note. One is that a
majority of these overseas Chinese were from Hong Kong and Taiwan and second, the data reported by Lo and Liu is
post 1991. Our argument here is that that the initial flows of FDI that China received in the 1980s due to ‘location and
timing’ (chance) resulted in a snowball effect leading to more FDI in the 1990s, regardless of the source of the FDI.
11

12

It should also be noted that the establishment of the special economic zones was a very controversial policy within
the Chinese central government at the time, and objections continued until at least 1992 when Deng Xiaoping visited
them for the first time and gave his public approval to the zones and the strategy behind them.
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